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Norbert L Steinkamp, Bert Gordijn, and Henk A. J. M. ten Have
Ethical Expertise Revisited: Reply to Giles 
Scofield
ABSTRACT. This reply to Giles Scofield’s critique of the authors’ article in the June 
2008 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal highlights two main topics. 
First, contrary to what Scofield suggests, using the terms “ethics” and “morality” 
interchangeably constitutes an oversimplification that blurs important distinctions. 
Second, in a representative democracy, ethical expertise and consultation need 
not generate a “tragic choice” of the kind Scofield has in mind.
In his response to our paper “Debating Ethical Expertise” (Steinkamp, Gordijn, and ten Have 2008) published in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Giles Scofield (2008a) suggests that the concept of 
ethical expertise implies leaving moral judgment to professional experts. 
Leaving moral judgment to an expert, however, would undermine indi-
vidual citizens’ autonomy by prescribing what they should decide, and how. 
Therefore, he argues that ethical expertise and democracy are incompat-
ible. The alleged incompatibility results in the debate being intractable as 
it finally constitutes a “tragic choice”:
Because there are problems associated with allowing everyone to choose as 
seems best to them and problems with permitting everyone to choose only as 
seems best to others, we understandably come to see that there are problems 
associated with our having ethics consultants and problems associated with 
our not having ethics consultants. (Scofield 2008a, p. 379)
Scofield considers our moderate, dialogic model of ethical expertise and 
moral competence a failed attempt to solve this dilemma. His critique 
aims at our interpretation of the theory of expertise by Hubert Dreyfus 
and Stuart Dreyfus (1990); our depiction and use of discourse ethics; and 
our interactive model of clinical ethics (Steinkamp and Gordijn 2001), 
which the author finds idealistic. The critique stems from serious concern 
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about, first, antiegalitarian implications that the author thinks the very 
idea of ethics consultation might set off and, second, the omission of 
professional ethics consultants to define binding professional standards 
(Scofield 2008b).
Several aspects of Scofield’s argument deserve closer analysis and dis-
cussion. In our reply, we limit ourselves to two of those topics. First, we 
argue that, contrary to what Scofield suggests, using the terms “ethics” 
and “morality” interchangeably constitutes an oversimplification that 
blurs important distinctions. Second, we argue that, in a representative 
democracy, ethical expertise and consultation need not generate a “tragic 
choice” of the kind Scofield has in mind.
MORALITY AND ETHICS
An important premise of Scofield’s argument is that ethics and moral-
ity are synonyms. A pragmatic reason to short-circuit these terms is the 
author’s observation that they often are used that way. “If one equates 
morality with ethics—and the terms are used interchangeably by the 
[American Society for Bioethics and Humanities] and others—nonethicists 
are, at best, two stages below (or beneath) ethicists” (Scofield 2008a, p. 
370).
If ethics and morality were synonyms, then any form of specialized 
access to ethical knowledge, including any derived activity, for example 
facilitation or counseling by a person trained in ethical reasoning, indeed 
would imply the consultant’s superiority and subordination on the side 
of consultees. In turn, heightened moral integrity might be expected from 
those who label themselves—or who are labeled by others—ethical ex-
perts. Scofield rightly predicts that “ . . . there is no reason to believe that 
ethical expertise necessarily turns someone into a moral pillar of society.” 
Instead, he is even confident that there is “ . . . every reason to suspect, 
if not believe, that every ethicist’s feet are made of clay” (Scofield 2008a, 
p. 373).
We are not sure whether we would draw the latter conclusion with the 
same determination. However, the observation that ethical expertise does 
not make somebody a morally better person confirms our view that ethics 
and morality should not be used as synonyms. There are essentially two 
ways to differentiate between these terms in practical philosophy. First, in 
a 1986 monograph, Wolfgang Kuhlmann opens a debate about (formal) 
morality versus (substantial) ethical life. Morality and ethical life represent 
two different dimensions, namely substantial moral values, norms, and 
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judgments (ethical life, Sittlichkeit) on the one hand, and formal as well 
as universalistic ethical principles and norms (Moralität) on the other 
(Kuhlmann 1986).
The second distinction between morality and ethics is found in our paper 
on “Debating Ethics Expertise.” According to our terminology, “morality” 
represents the sum total of substantial moral values, norms, and judgments 
that are agreed upon within a larger social framework—e.g., a society, a 
state, a religious community, or an institution—however criticized a specific 
morality under particular historical circumstances may turn out to be in 
reality. The term “ethics” instead refers to philosophical reflections about 
morality, typically elaborated into an argumentative system.
The latter distinction between ethics and morality is common in analytic 
philosophy. It implies that a professional intellectual approach to com-
mon and ordinary human activities is situated at a different level than the 
activities themselves—i.e., a meta-level. For example, “being an ethical 
expert” is not the same as “making moral judgments,” which is indeed a 
common human activity, in the same way that “being a caregiver” is not 
the same as “taking care of oneself,” which almost every human being is 
able to do. The difference between the two levels allows for the existence 
of special expertise, situated at a meta-level with regard to common hu-
man activities. This expertise is not contradictory or antagonistic to the 
more basic level, but it incorporates a systematic reflection upon and 
generalization of moral experience and judgment about that basic level 
of common human activities.
MORAL COMPETENCE AND ETHICAL EXPERTISE
Every health care provider, regardless of whether he or she has had any 
training in ethics, has intuitions and opinions about what is morally right 
and wrong in relation to professional practice. This is what we mean by 
moral competence: A competence sui generis of health care profession-
als, not an inferior derivative of (professional) ethical expertise.1 What 
a person with academic training in ethics may have that the health care 
professional may not is a professional command of ethical theories and 
reasoning. Expertise so understood does not diminish, but rather works 
to inform and guide a health care provider’s moral competence to develop 
it to the best of its potential. For example, in the case of facilitation of 
moral deliberation on the ward according to a carefully elaborated pro-
tocol, the contribution of medical professionals is complemented by the 
involvement of nurses and other professional groups in the deliberation. 
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Carefully verbalized, this may improve awareness of the moral dimensions 
of the situation and help to analyze all ethical aspects from more than one 
dominant perspective.
In our moderate and dialogic approach to expertise, we attribute to 
the ethicist a narrow concept of argumentative ethical knowledge and 
skills as well as interactive competence, which is to be used to facilitate 
and educate health care providers to develop further their competence 
to substantiate moral judgments. The concept implies a willingness and 
ability to respect others’ moral perceptions and faculty of judgment and 
to support and provide them with the means to employ their individual 
moral competence in moral deliberations (Steinkamp, Gordijn, ten Have 
2008, p. 188). It does all but imply that health care providers “[surrender 
their] private judgment . . . to persons with ‘ethical expertise’”(Scofield 
2008a, p. 373). Apart from that, it is not primarily private judgment 
that is at stake in health care delivery, but educated moral assessment of 
professional responsibility.
We consider it essential to face the potential harm that can be caused by 
the abuse of ethical expertise and to counteract it as much as possible by 
transparent and clear-cut standards of professionalism. Scofield (2008b) 
has rightly elaborated on the omission of the ethics consultation commu-
nity to do so up until now. According to the moderate concept of ethical 
expertise, ethicists are not to be conceived of as consultants analogous to 
medical or other specialists. Rather they are architects or mediators who 
keep spaces open for moral reflection and deliberation about professional 
practice to take place (Walker 1993). In addition to moral case delibera-
tion on the micro-level of joint decision making within teams, the means 
to create such space at the meso-level of institutions are Healthcare Ethics 
Committees (HECs).
Hence, unlike Scofield (2007, p. 45), who claims that ethicists’ livelihood 
and standpoint “depends on and . . . requires a generalized belief in the 
moral incompetence of others,” our concept of ethical expertise requires 
an identification, appreciation, and fostering of the moral competence of 
health care professionals in teaching programs, both during professional 
training (in medical or nursing schools) and in professional practice. 
The notion of moral competence is intended clearly to appreciate the 
autonomy of health care providers in making moral judgments, prior to 
any intervention by an ethicist. Counseling or facilitation notwithstanding, 
health care providers are and remain the subjects of decision making and 
problem solving when moral problems occur in clinical practice. As we 
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have pointed out elsewhere, neither a HEC nor an ethics consultant can 
or should replace a health care professional’s own faculty of judgment (see 
Steinkamp and Gordijn 2001). Their task is to complement it.
As to moral competence, the contribution of expertise of a person 
trained in ethics can be rather indirect. For example, an ethicist, as scien-
tific secretary of a HEC, develops draft set of guidelines, which through 
the process of deliberation become a product of the whole committee. 
Other examples are the responsibility of ethicists in the development of 
teaching programs to foster and enhance moral competence and his or 
her role as moderator in ethical case deliberation. Of course, this is not to 
say that only ethicists can or should be facilitators of case deliberation, or 
that nothing other than training in ethics is required to develop a decent 
teaching program in clinical ethics. What should become evident, however, 
is that this form of expertise does not require a generalized belief in the 
moral incompetence of others (Scofield 2007, p. 45).
ETHICAL EXPERTISE AND DEMOCRACY
Democracy is a political system, a form of government, where the 
people elect representatives for decision making. It is useful to distinguish 
between different responsibilities. Political decision makers are responsible 
for government policy; they are not experts or technocrats. During the 
early stages of the decision making that representatives must undertake on 
complex issues, they often seek knowledge and advice from professional 
advisors or (mixed) committees, in order to inform themselves about rel-
evant aspects of the issues. We agree that in democratic societies everyone 
should be entitled to choose for him-or herself. However, the validity of 
this statement in the given context of institutional health care delivery is 
limited in two ways.
The first limitation has to do with representative democracy, where deci-
sion making is partly transferred to delegates. It is essential that the proce-
dures of this transfer as well as all of its restrictions be clearly and openly 
agreed upon. Experts can gather and provide reliable information to aid the 
representatives with their task. In the end, however, responsibility for making 
the decisions rests with the representatives (Weber-Hassemer 2008).
A similar distinction can be made in the practice of ethics consultation. 
Ethicists clarify, analyze, provide information, and suggest options. Clini-
cians remain responsible for decision making. Ethical experts normally do 
not, and in fact they never should, make treatment decisions themselves 
(Steinkamp and Gordijn 2003).
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Hence, the claim that expertise in ethical reasoning is incompatible with 
democratic, nonauthoritarian deliberation is problematic. We argue that 
deliberation and authority can be reconciled as long as authority, including 
the authority of an expert, is acquired on the basis of accomplishment and 
credibility, not coercion. If this condition is met, expertise is not necessarily 
authoritarian. This implies that an ethical expert need not, and sometimes 
ought not, limit him- or herself to merely mirroring the judgments of oth-
ers. Rather, it implies that, for example, the ethicist has a responsibility, 
if necessary, to point out when propositions are blatantly incorrect and 
to demonstrate that he or she is sufficiently capable and courageous to 
dispute others. Nondirectiveness would indeed, as Scofield (2008a, p. 379) 
rightly points out, come down to being illusionary.
The second limitation has to do with the peculiarities of responsibility 
in professional organizations. Although we concede that both the doctor-
patient relationship and the wider context of health care institutions have 
undergone and should still be undergoing change as a result of critique 
of antidemocratic traditions (Lebeer 2002), we think that considerations 
about democracy are of relative value when it comes to the function of 
ethical expertise and moral competence in decision making. The reason 
is that in health care institutions as professional organizations, ethical 
expertise is not primarily related to the free exchange of opinions between 
citizens, but to the less arbitrary exchange of experience and judgment 
among health care professionals, and between health care professionals 
and their patients. Although these contextual peculiarities render ethical 
expertise less problematic, they require modesty and wisdom on the side 
of the ethicist, and safeguards on the institutional (meso-) and societal 
(macro-)levels both to guarantee the professional standards of ethicists 
(Loewy and Loewy 2005) and to protect the space needed for moral 
deliberation.
CONCLUSION
We did not originally conceive our paper “Debating Ethical Expertise” 
as a contributionto the debate on professional ethics consultation as de-
veloped and widely established in U.S.-American health care institutions. 
Rather, the background of the paper lies in debates within the context 
of European health systems with their diverse historical and institutional 
experiences. Our concept of ethical expertise is not a top-down model to 
reconcile the knowledge of privileged individuals with a presumed hostile 
environment. Rather it is a bottom-up model to explore the kinds of sup-
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port that can be made available to health care professionals, aiming to 
unfold and enhance moral competence that already is present implicitly in 
professional practice. Parallel to the contribution of HECs, ethical expertise 
is seen as an amplification of the tentative developments of democratic 
structures in a context determined by professional responsibility, rather 
than a threat to these developments.
Of the numerous points in Scofield’s critique that deserve closer atten-
tion and study, we have chosen only two to discuss here. We think that 
to avoid either blending or mutual annihilation of ethical expertise and 
moral competence, careful differentiation between ethics and morality is 
required. We also have shown that on our view, democracy and ethical 
expertise are not mutually exclusive terms.
NOTE
1. In Scofield’s view, of the five stages of expertise presented by Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus—Novice, Advanced Beginner, Competent, Proficient, Expert—the 
ethical expert represents the highest stage, whereas the morally competent 
health care provider ranges on a significantly lower level. We might indeed, 
by our use of the theory of Dreyfus and Dreyfus, by introducing moral com-
petence as a complementary concept to ethical expertise, and by identifying 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s notion of ethical expertise with health care providers’ 
moral competence, have invited a reading of this part of our paper different 
from that which we originally intended. A further elaboration of a theory 
of moral competence seems to be necessary, in which the independence and 
autonomy of moral competence is maintained more clearly, and in which 
reflexivity of morally competent subjects plays a more significant role.
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